Contents
A Fanatic Militarist
Hideki Tojo
Spy Leaderr
Kenji Doihara
Prime Culprit in Nanking Massacre
Iwane Matsui
Order-giver of Pearl Harbor Raid
Osami Nagano
Short-lived Wartime Prime Minister
Kiichiro Hiranuma
Participating in the Aggression War from Beginning to End
Yoshijiro Um ezu
Promoter of Fascist Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan
Toshio Sh iratori
Chief Plotter of September 18 Incident
Seishiro It agaki
Conspirator to Start the Pacific War
Heitaro Kimura
Advocator for Aggressive and Expansionist Policy
Akira Muto
Only Civil Official Being Hanged
Koki Hirota
Engaging in War Diplomacy
Sh igenori Togo
The Diplomat Pushing Japan to War
Yosuke Matsuoka
Wartime Prime Minister Following Hideki Tojo
Kuniaki Koiso
內容試閱：
Prime Culprit in Nanking Massacre
Iwane Matsui
General Iwane Matsui was the arch-criminal for the infamous Rape of Nanking that occurred during a six-week period following Japanese capture of that city at the year-end of 1937.
An ‘expert’ on China
Matsui was born in a samurai’s family in Nagoya on July 27, 1878. He graduated from the ninth class of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1898. His classmates included Sadao Araki, Jinzaburo Masaki, Shigeru Honjo, and Nobuyuki Abe, all having played an important role in Japan’s aggression and expansion in the future. Matsui then entered the Army War College. He fought in the Russo- Japanese War of 1904-1905 and was wounded in a battle. After the war, he resumed his studies at the Army War College, and, after graduation in 1906, was commissioned senior captain. In the following years, he acted as military attaché to Guangdong and Shanghai successively, and became commanding officer of the 39th Regiment in 1919. He served as an intelligence staff officer in 1921 at the Vladivostok Expeditionary Force. In 1922 he was transferred to be head of the Harbin Special Services Agency in Manchuria, and was promoted to major general the next year. He then became commanding officer of the 35th Infantry Brigade in 1924, and was transferred in 1925 to be chief of intelligence of the Army General Staff Office. In 1927 he was promoted to lieutenant general, and was appointed in 1928 as commander of the 11th Division. From December 1931 to August 1932 he was the Japanese plenipotentiary to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In March 1933 Matsui was appointed a member of the Supreme War Council; in August he acted as commander-in-chief of the Taiwan Army of Japan; in October he was promoted to senior general. However in 1935 he retired from active military service.
Staying in China for 13 years altogether, Matsui had become a typical “sinologue.” Serving in the Japanese army, he had supported, and actively participated in plotting the acts of aggression against China. In the summer of 1927 Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka convened a “Far East Conference.” Matsui as chief of intelligence of the Army General Staff Office made a report at the meeting on China’s political situation. When acting as commander-in-chief of the Taiwan Army of Japan, he formed a “Greater Asia Association” in 1933, whipping up opinion for a war of aggression.
Taking command of battles in Shanghai, Nanking
In the year of 1936 Matsui traveled to the southern provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi, meeting with local KMT leaders including Hu Hanmin 1879-1936, Chen Jitang 1890-1954, Li Zongren 1891- 1969 and Bai Chongxi 1893-1966. He went about selling his theory of “Greater Asia.” Coming back to Nanking, he even tried to persuade Chiang Kai-shek into recognizing Manchukuo, but was flatly refused. After leaving China in a huff, Matsui became even more eager to conquer this country. He had said on various occasions that it was necessary to teach the Nanking government a good lesson by using force.
Just two days after the start of the August 13 Incident of 1937, Matsui was recalled by the army to serve as commander of the Japanese Shanghai Expeditionary Force SEF. Before leaving Tokyo, he declared that the Chinese capital of Nanking was his final target. The campaign in Shanghai, also known as the Battle of Songhu,1 lasted nearly three months. Over 1 million troops from both sides were thrown into the battle. At Matsui’s request, Japan repeatedly dispatched reinforcements to Shanghai. Altogether the Army General Staff employed 14 and a half divisions of about 280,000 soldiers, more than 30 warships, 400 fighter planes and 300 armored vehicles for the campaign. On November 7 Matsui was concurrently appointed as commander-in-chief of the newly formed Central China Area Army CCAA that had the SEF and the 10th Army under its command. The Japanese forces finally captured the city on November 12, while suffering casualties of over 40,000 men.
After winning the Battle of Songhu, without the approval by the General Headquarters, Matsui immediately ordered his troops to advance toward Nanking from different directions. On November 22 he formally reported to the Army General Staff Office, claiming that Nanking must be occupied, and with available forces the goal could be attained within two months at the latest. On December 1 the Army General Staff cabled the CCAA to make an attack on the capital city. The same day Japanese troops seized the fortress of Jiangyin. On December 5 they pushed forward to Nanking’s outside defense line. Two days later they launched an all-out offensive, broke through the defense line and moved forward to the city’s vicinity. On December 10 Matsui sent planes to airdrop his ultimatum to the besieged city; at the same time the 10th Army’s 18th Division captured Wuhu, cutting off the defenders’ retreat. On December 12, the Gate of China south gate was shelled with heavy artillery by the well-equipped Sixth Division also of the 10th Army. Massive blasts made several breaches in the city wall, through which Japanese troops came swarming. The capital finally fell the next day. On December 17, led by Matsui, the CCAA made a triumphal entry into the city.
Prime culprit for Nanking Massacre
On December 7 Matsui ordered that even if the Chinese defenders gave up resistance, Japanese troops should conduct mopping-up operations after entering the city. He did not say a single word about the POW issue. After the fall of Nanking, on December 15 he once again ordered the Japanese army to mop up the remnants of the enemy in the city. With his connivance and tacit consent, almost all divisions of the CCAA at that time adopted the policy of killing all POWs, hence committing a most atrocious massacre in this ancient capital of a thousand-year long history.
In a short period of six weeks, the conquerors wantonly burned killed and looted, stopping at no evil. Over 300,000 people, mostly civilians and POWs, were brutally slaughtered with various methods such as shooting, bayoneting, burying alive and drowning. And more than 20,000 women were raped. About one-third of the city was completely destroyed, causing innumerable losses in property. As the commanding officer, from the start Matsui had not taken any measures to prevent his troops from committing the barbarous and inhuman atrocities. Of course he had inescapable responsibility for the tragedy of the Nanking Massacre.
The outrages of the Japanese army shocked the international community. Under the pressure of world opinion, on March 5, 1938 the Japanese government recalled Matsui and some 80 of his subordinates. He took up the post of cabinet councilor in July 1938 and resigned two years later. On April 4, 1942 he was decorated with the first-class Golden Kite Medal “for the meritorious war services during the China Incident.”
After the war, Matsui was arrested by the SCAP authorities on September 19, 1945 and charged with war crimes, specifically in connection with the Nanking Massacre. During the following IMTFE trial, although admitting his troops behaved wrongly in Nanking, Matsui quibbled that he was ill at that time, so was not able to stop the outrages. The Tribunal refuted his explanation with ironclad proofs, and ruled that: “His illness was not sufficient to prevent his conducting the military operations of his command nor to prevent his visiting the city for days while these atrocities were occurring. He was in command of the army responsible for these happenings. He knew of them. He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his failure to discharge this duty.”
The Tribunal convicted him of count 55, namely, “deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches thereof of the Laws and Customs of War as contained in and proved by the Geneva Conventions, and thereby violated the laws of war.” On November 12, 1948 Matsui was sentenced to death by hanging. He was hanged at Sugamo Prison on December 23.
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